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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effects of ignored inefficiencies on the reliability of sustainability 
indicators and effectiveness of investment in resource-based economies. A model of a social 
planner does not include some phenomena that may influence the path of utility. These 
unspecified phenomena may cause inefficiency of the economy. In order to simulate this 
natural discrepancy between theory and real life, this study assumes that the planner applies 
the policies developed for an efficient (undistorted) model, whereas the real economy is 
distorted by some neglected effects that can influence utility, production, the balance 
equation, and the dynamics of the reserve. The resulting inefficiency affects the dependence 
of current utility change on investment. The analysis shows that, for sustainability in the 
presence of inefficiency, first, institutional and resource policies may become more important 
than investments; and secondly, it is preferable to underextract a natural resource under 
uncertainties in production possibilities and damages from economic activities. An 
inadequate accounting system, underestimated production possibilities, and insecure 
property rights are considered as examples of disregarded inefficiencies. 
                                                        
† This paper is a development of the paper “Investment and resource policy under a modified Hotelling 
rule” presented at the 4th World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists (Montreal, 
2010). 
 2 
 
Keywords   Dynamic inefficiency · Investment · Natural resource · Sustainability 
JEL Classification  O13 ·  O47 ·  Q32 ·  Q38 
Abbreviations  CUC – Current utility change; GI – Genuine investment; HR – Hotelling rule; 
DHS – Dasgupta-Heal-Solow 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sustainability of real economies is always evaluated in the presence of uncertainties in 
future production possibilities and in various distortions such as institutional imperfections, 
economic wastefulness, and damages from economic activities to utility and production. 
These uncertainties lead to errors in the decisions of a social planner and cause deviations 
from an efficient and optimal path of economic development. Since practical policies are 
based on simplified models, inefficiencies always exist in real economies, and it is important 
to learn how they may affect the reliability of sustainability indicators and sustainability 
policies developed for simplified models. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 identifies the place of this study in the 
literature; Section 3 describes the approach to modelling a dynamically inefficient “distorted” 
economy and derives the main theoretical results; Section 4 illustrates these results with the 
examples of various types of inefficient economies; Section 5 shows the dependence of 
sustainability evaluation on the specification of the model and the form of indicator, using the 
example of Russian oil extraction; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 3 
2. Contribution of this study 
 
The literature on sustainability evaluation of resource-based economies offers an 
indicator of sustainable development, called genuine (net) saving or genuine investment (GI), 
which is equal to increase in man-made capital minus resource depletion. This indicator was 
developed in the studies of the change in the current (present) value of consumption or utility 
at a specific moment in time in dynamically efficient, optimal or competitive economies. 
Straightforward application of these results to real-world resource economies may create the 
impression that a non-declining path of utility can be achieved by investment policy only, 
regardless of other factors that may affect sustainability. 
The current paper extends some of the theoretical studies by assuming that a planner, 
due to imperfections in knowledge or in institutions, uses the policies developed for a 
simplified (undistorted) model that deviates from the real economy. This natural discrepancy 
between a model and real life results in inefficiency and, in some cases, unsustainability of 
the economy. Moreover, the sustainability policies developed for an undistorted model may 
be inapplicable to an inefficient unsustainable economy because a feasible investment 
providing a non-declining path of utility may not exist. In these cases, the inefficiency must be 
reduced first, for example, a planner should correct institutions or the accounting system, and 
only then the “undistorted” sustainability policies can be applied. 
The idea of developing sustainability indicators stems from the result of Hartwick 
(1977). The “invest resource rent” rule (zero GI), offered in this paper, addresses the problem 
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formulated in Solow (1974) for the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS)1 model of a maximin-optimal 
resource-based economy satisfying the standard Hotelling rule (HR) as a necessary condition 
of dynamic efficiency. For this model, zero GI with resource depletion measured in market 
prices leads to constant per capita consumption over time. Dixit et al. (1980) extended the 
Hartwick rule by showing that, for a more general production function in a competitive 
economy with multiple assets, GI that is constant over time in present prices is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a constant path of utility.2 Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 303-306), 
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), and Hamilton et al. (2006) analyzed the link between GI in 
current prices and current change in per capita consumption. Hamilton and Withagen (2007) 
derived the result of Dixit et al. (1980), as well as the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), 
in a more general setting (for multiple consumption good and internalized externalities), 
showing that instantaneous utility increases if and only if GI decreases in present prices. 
Various forms of the indicator GI developed for efficient economies have been used 
for practical evaluations of sustainability. For example, Pearce and Atkinson (1993) offered a 
simple indicator of weak sustainability3 based on the assertion that “an economy is 
sustainable if it saves more than the combined depreciation on the two forms of capital” (man-
made and natural). A variant of this indicator, modified for open economies, has been 
                                                        
1 This model with the Cobb-Douglas production function, which includes a nonrenewable resource as a 
factor, was developed in the works of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974). 
2 Constant investment in present prices means that investment in current prices is growing with the 
rate of discount. 
3 Weak sustainability of growth (development) is defined in Pezzey (1992) as non-decreasing per 
capita consumption (utility). 
 5 
developed in Proops et al. (1999). These indicators were used in both papers to classify a 
number of countries into sustainable and unsustainable. Hamilton and Clemens (1999) 
developed a theory of genuine saving by adding the investment in human capital to traditional 
net savings and subtracting the value of resource depletion and environmental damage. The 
value of genuine saving was offered as an indicator of sustainability, and this indicator was 
used for comparing sustainability of a wide range of developing countries. A review of 
empirical work on sustainability evaluation can be found in Hamilton (2010). As Hamilton and 
Hartwick (2005, p. 615) noted, “the magnitude of ‘net investment’ or ‘genuine savings’ has 
become a central focus in the measurement of the sustainability of an economy.” 
While most of the above mentioned theoretical results were obtained for optimal or 
competitive economies, Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) and Arrow et al. (2003), developing a 
theory of sustainable resource use in imperfect economies, proved that the accounting (or 
shadow) price4 of a natural resource can be considerably higher than the market price, 
implying that the investment of the market resource rent and even the entire marked-valued 
output into man-made capital can be insufficient to compensate for damages caused by the 
resource extraction. In other words, GI in shadow prices may be negative despite any effort in 
saving, suggesting that, for some inefficient economies, institutional and resource policies are 
prerequisites of sustainability. Unfortunately, accurate shadow prices are not observable in 
real economies due to uncertainties in population growth, damages from economic activities, 
and future production possibilities (resource reserves estimates and rates of technical 
change). These uncertainties usually are dealt with by stochastic models in theory and 
                                                        
4 The shadow price of the resource shows the change in the social (intergenerational) welfare when 
the resource stock is changed by one unit. 
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optimistic-pessimistic scenarios in practice. Both approaches result in some errors and, 
therefore, in inefficiencies. Asheim (2010), showing that the value of GI “cannot serve as a 
reliable indicator of sustainability,” noted also that inefficiency may further loosen the link 
between GI and sustainability. 
The current paper continues the studies of sustainability indicators and policies in 
imperfect economies by examining the effects of disregarded inefficiencies. Proposition 1 
provides the link between “undistorted” GI and current utility change (CUC) in a dynamically 
inefficient economy. This result extends Proposition 1 of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), and 
shows that 1) CUC may be determined only by the influence of inefficiency when this 
influence is not close to zero; and 2) resource economies can be classified by importance of 
investment, resource, or institutional policies for CUC. This study (Corollary 1) extends also 
(to a more general form of inefficiency) the effect noticed by van der Ploeg (2011) that 
insecure property rights require more effort in investment to maintain constant per capita 
consumption. Corollary 1 adds, in particular, that underestimation of future production 
possibilities requires less investment than in the “undistorted” case. 
The examples of distortions (Section 4) include 1) a resource-augmenting technical 
change that distorts the dynamics of the stock and leads to a sustainable but dynamically 
inefficient economy when a planner does not take it into account; 2) inadequate accounting 
system that ignores the damages from the resource use to utility and production, which leads 
to inefficiency and unsustainability; and 3) insecure property rights that also cause inefficiency 
and unsustainability, unless corrected by institutional reforms and resource policies. 
The results of this study illustrate that, for sustainability, it is preferable to 
underestimate future production possibilities and overestimate damages since this policy of 
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extra caution can reduce irreversible losses. Of course, this policy may lead to dynamic 
inefficiency caused by an overly conservative resource policy, but with updates in knowledge, 
the policy can be corrected, and the economy can be asymptotically efficient. 
Besides disregarded inefficiencies, the study shows how sustainability evaluation may 
depend on the specification of the same effects in the model and on the form of the indicator 
(Section 5). An indicator linked to CUC may be, by construction, insensitive to the changes in 
the long-term ability of an economy to maintain non-declining utility. On the other hand, an 
indicator that shows long-term sustainability, also by construction, may be insensitive to CUC, 
also leading to violation of sustainability at the initial point. Therefore, various indicators may 
complement each other. The dependence of sustainability evaluation on the model and on 
the form of the indicator is illustrated with the example of Russian oil extraction. 
 
3. Investment and growth in inefficient economy 
 
In order to define a distorted economy, it is instructive to introduce first a “perfect” or 
undistorted optimizing economy. Following Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, p. 618), assume 
that the economy is closed, time t  is continuous, consumption is aggregated into a single 
good ,C  labour is fixed, so that output ),(=)( RKFtQ  depends on man-made capital )(tK  
and the resource flow ),(=)( tStR -  where )(tS  is the current resource stock ( dtdSS /=: ). 
The technology is stationary ( F  does not depend explicitly on t ). 
A number of studies, which results were used for practical evaluation of sustainability, 
assume that the economy satisfies the following: 
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 ),( RKF  is a regular production function that (a) denotes the maximum output for the given 
K  and ,R  and (b) satisfies the Inada conditions, in particular 0>RF  (resource 
productiveness), where ;/=: RFFR ∂∂  
  output Q  equals ),( RKF  (static efficiency);5 
 the balance equation holds: ,),(=+ KδRKFKC -  where K  is investment and Kδ  with 
constδ =  is capital decay (non-wastefulness); 
 the standard HR RR rFF = 6 holds as a necessary condition of dynamic efficiency; 
 the economy (a planner) maximizes a (social) welfare function by choosing the paths of K  
and R  (optimality). 
In the real world, however, the resource use can be 
 non-productive ( 0=RF ) or counter-productive ( 0<RF );7 
 productive, but static-inefficient ( ),(< RKFQ ); 
 productive, static-efficient, but wasteful ( KδRKFKC -),(<+  ); 
 productive, static-efficient, non-wasteful, but dynamically inefficient; 
 productive, non-wasteful, efficient, but not optimal. 
                                                        
5 Conventionally, efficiency is defined via the Pareto-optimality. Some studies, for example Hurwicz 
(1960), called this notion non-wastefulness. 
6 Here, δ(t)Ftr K -=:)(  is the market interest rate. 
7 The resource use is counter-productive when the decline in the resource stock results in the decline 
of output, for example, as a result of a wildfire or oil spill. 
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This paper assumes that there is a vector ( ),)(),(),(),(=)( 4321 tDtDtDtDtD  called 
distortion, which components are the distortions in 
production: ),,,(= 1DRKFF  (1) 
social utility: ),,(= 2DCUU  (2) 
the balance equation: ,),,(= 31 DKδCDRKFK ---  (3) 
the dynamics of the stock: .+= 4DRS -  (4) 
The distortions may include imperfections, externalities, and any effects (including 
favourable for sustainability) that cause violation of the standard HR. 
To illustrate the claims of this study, it is enough to accept the following 
Assumptions: 1) D  depends on parameters that do not depend on time explicitly8 or 
2) D  depends only on the extracted amount .)(+)(=)(=)( 0 400 ∫∫ -
tt ξdξDtSSξdξRtX  
Hence, D  do not depend here on ,R 9 ,K  and .C  For example, 1D  and 2D  may 
result from irreversible damages caused by economic activities (stock externalities, for 
example, due to climate change); 3D  may stand for the growing cost of extraction (best-
                                                        
8 D  may depend, for example, on the parameters that express institutional imperfections. 
9 In fact, D  may depend on ,R  for example, when damage includes opportunity cost (Gaudet et al., 
2006), or when damage is partly reversible. Then formula (6) below is more complicated, which does 
not alter the conclusions of the paper. D  may also depend on the non-extracted resource, for 
example, when the stock has an amenity value (D’Autume, Schubert, 2008). Then, expressing this 
value in terms of utility, the problem can be reformulated by introducing the damage from the resource 
extraction. The latter approach may be more precise, since the uncertainty in the extracted stock is 
less than in the remaining. A review of studies with the modified HR is, for example, in Gaudet (2007). 
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quality stock extracted first) or for static inefficiency and (or) for wastefulness of the economy 
( 0>3D ); 4D  may be the productivity of the stock-augmenting investment, which is, first, 
growing with the extraction due to learning-by-doing and eventually declining due to the 
scarcity of the resource. 
Let 5D  be a deviation of the ratio RR FF /  from a dynamically efficient path. Then the 
following result holds. 
Lemma 1. In economy (1)-(4), 
[ ] ,)(+)(= RR FtτtvF         (5) 
where ,=:)( δFtv K - 10 )(tτ 11 XDDtτ ∂∂{- 45=:)]([= D  
 ,/}/]//+/)/[(+ 312 12 SXFXDXDFXDUU RDCD ∂∂∂∂-∂∂∂∂    (6) 
and 0=5D  if the economy is dynamically efficient. 
Proof is in Appendix 1. 
In this framework, dynamic efficiency is a relative notion. The planner’s optimal path 
may be dynamically inefficient with respect to a first-best solution, for example, because the 
planner underestimates future production possibilities and considers the first-best path as 
infeasible (Section 4.1). The planner’s path may also be inefficient when the planner ignores 
some effects while estimating social progress. In the latter case, the planner may even 
consider the first-best path as inefficient due to the difference between the units of measure 
for utility in the planner’s and the first-best solutions (Section 4.2). 
                                                        
10  )(tv  is the market interest rate only with no distortion. 
11 )(tτ  is the additive HR modifier or the influence of .D  This influence can be expressed in a 
multiplicative form: [ ] ,= RR FηvF D  where [ ] [ ] ./+1=: vτη DD  With no distortion, .0=τ  
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Deviation 5D  may depend on ,D  for example on ,4D  when a planner does not take 
into account resource-augmenting investments (D5 = (∂D4/∂X)⋅(∂X/∂S), Section 4.1), or on 
1D  and 2D  when the planner ignores the damages from the resource extraction (Section 
4.2). In some cases, however, 5D  may not depend on ,D  and instead, both 5D  and D  may 
be determined by the same phenomena, for example, imperfect institutions (Section 4.3). 
Genuine investment (GI) defined in Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) is 
),()(+)(=:)( tFtStKtG R        (7) 
which equals )()(-)( tFtRtK R  in the undistorted economy. This measure includes not only the 
investment into man-made capital K  but the value of the extracted resource S  estimated in 
the marginal resource productivity ,RF  which, with no distortion, coincides with the market 
price. Therefore, G  corresponds to a combination of investment and resource policies. 
In the general case, GI is defined as ∑i ii tKptG )(=:)(   where iK  are various forms of 
man-made (including human and intangible) and natural capital, and ip  are the shadow 
prices equal to the marginal change in social welfare V  resulting from a change in :iK  
ii KVp ∂∂ /=:  (Arrow et al. 2003).12 By construction, G  must coincide with the change in 
social welfare resulting from the combination of investment and resource policies at the 
                                                        
12 For example, under the utilitarian criterion, [ ] ,)(),(),(=)( 21∫∞t dssπsKsKUtV   where π  is a 
discount factor, and, under maximin, [ ],),(),(=)( 21* tKtKUtV  where *U  is the maximum level of 
utility that can be maintained forever given the current assets .),(),( 21 tKtK  
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current moment: ( )∑ ∂∂i ii KKVKKV  /=),,( 21  (if V  does not depend on time explicitly).13 
Then, if V  reflects the ability of the economy to maintain non-declining utility, the indicator GI 
shows the change in sustainability of the economy. 
As was mentioned above, sustainability of real economies is always evaluated under 
imperfections including imperfections in knowledge and in models that are used for this 
evaluation. Therefore, in practical sustainability evaluation, a model welfare function and the 
correspondent indicator GI never include all the factors that will affect the long-term path of 
utility in the real economy. In order to examine the effect of this discrepancy, this study 
considers indicator GI in the form of (7), which corresponds to the “undistorted” economy. 
Since utility may be distorted by ,2D  the dependence of utility on consumption may be 
nonmonotonic; therefore, consumption cannot substitute utility as a measure of well-being 
(see, for example, Section 4.2). Hence, the proposition below establishes the link between G  
and ,U  which includes the link between G  and C as a special case. 
Proposition 1. Current utility change (CUC) in distorted economy (1)-(4) is 
,Ψ+)/(= 000 CUGGGvU  -        (8) 
where G0 is the GI indicator for the undistorted economy, and 
 ]+)/+1)( -/--(+[-=:Ψ 442135 21 RRCDDRC FDSXFDUUDFDDRFDU
 ∂∂  
is the influence of dynamic inefficiency. 
Proof is in Appendix 2. 
                                                        
13 If social welfare depends on endogenous processes such as population growth or technical change, 
the time derivative is ( ) ./+/=),,,( 21 ∑ ∂∂∂∂ i ii KKVtVKKtV   
 13 
In a particular case, when the economy is dynamically efficient ( 0=Ψ=5D ), formula 
(8) can be obtained from the results of Dixit et al. (1980) and Hamilton and Withagen (2007), 
expressed in present prices (see the proof). With no distortion, Eq. (8) coincides with the 
result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005). In the general case, Eq. (8) shows that investment (7) 
can indeed determine U  if the influence of Ψ is relatively small. However, U  can be also 
completely determined by Ψ when the term CGUGGv )/( -  is close to zero. 
Of course, sharp changes in G  can determine an instant sign of U  despite the large 
values of Ψ. Formula (8) shows that if there is a ,= tt  such that )(Ψ t  has a large positive 
(negative) value, )(tU  can be negative (positive) if )(tG  is negative (positive) and )(/)( tGtG  
has a large positive (negative) value. However, these cases are not relevant to sustainability 
due to the boundedness of investments, whereas distortions in general are less restricted. 
The boundedness of investment implies that the larger is Ψ, the shorter is the period of time 
when these cases are possible. Therefore, neglecting the short-run oscillations, it can be 
assumed, for determinateness, that ,<</ ∞vGG 14 where ,0>v  and the current 
investment K  is bounded by the current output .Q  Then a feasible investment can be 
defined as follows. 
Definition 1. Investment )()(=)( tQtwtK  is feasible if )1,0()( ∈tw  and vGG </  for 
any .0≥t  
Definition 1 results in the following Corollary. 
Corollary 1. If D4≡0, Eq. (8) implies that 
                                                        
14 The analysis can be easily complemented with the case where ./ vGG ≥  
 14 
(I) for a feasible investment, 
U <>  if only and if  0   
G <>  ( ) [ ] ( )[ ],/+1// 5<>5 /GG-vDQRFw  or  /GG-vDRF RR  15 or (9) 
Ψ <
>  ( ) CGU/GG-v-   or  
5D ><  ( ) ( )( ).RFKGGv R 1// --   (10) 
(II) a feasible investment can change the sign of U  if and only if 
( )<GG-v-  5D  ( ) ( )( ).1< -RFQGG-v R  (11) 
The following examples show that the impact of dynamic inefficiency on the efficacy of 
investment depends on the level of output and the share of the resource rent in output. 
Assume that 0=4D , ,06.0=v  and 03.0=/GG  at .0≥t  
(a) Large resource-poor economy. Let 101=)(tQ  and .1=)()( tFtR R  Then (Corollary 
1) an investment policy ( K ) can change the sign of )(tU  if and only if 
.3<<03.0 5D-  
(b) Small resource-rich economy. For 11=)(tQ  and ,10=)()( -tFtS R  an investment 
policy can affect the sign of )(tU  if and only if 
                                                        
15 When βαRKRKFQ =),(=  and ,/)1-(= *5 KNξD  where N is the number of the owners of the 
common resource and *ξ  is the coefficient of violation of property rights, condition (9) takes the form: 
[ ],)/--/()1-(+1 *<> QKQKδQαNξβw   which, for 0=δ  and under requirement of constant per capita 
consumption, becomes [ ],)/()1-(+1= * QαNξβw  coinciding with the result of van der Ploeg (2011). In 
more detail, this example is considered in Section 4.3 with a more general production function. 
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.003.0<<03.0 5D-  
It is intuitive that a large economy has more opportunities in investment than a small 
one, and so the range for ,5D  in which investment is able to affect the sign of utility change, 
is larger in case (a) than in case (b). Another difference between these two cases is that 
investment in a large resource-poor economy can change the sign of U  mostly when 5D  
affects U  negatively (positive 5D  reduces U ). This asymmetry is inverted in case (b). 
The boundedness of investments implies that the current states of economies along 
the planner’s paths belong to the one of the four following types determined by different roles 
of resource (institutional) and investment policies in the current change of utility depending on 
the level of inefficiency .5D  
(A) ( ) ( )[ ] :1-RFQGG-vD R5 ≥  utility declines regardless of investment; non-negative 
values of U  can be obtained only by reduction of the inefficiency if it is still possible.16 
(B) ( ) ( )[ ] :1<<0 -RFQGG-vD R5   utility growth can be achieved by investment policy 
alone; the optimal saving rate is higher than under 0=Ψ  (see the second inequality in 
condition (9)) in order to compensate not only for the shrinking natural capital but for the 
negative effect of inefficiency. Without a policy reducing ,5D  the level of utility may be lower 
than under .0=Ψ  
                                                        
16 Possibility of reduction of inefficiency depends on the state of the economy with respect to tipping 
points. This problem is not considered in this study. 
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(C) ( ) :0<< 5DGG-v-   utility growth can be achieved by investment policy alone; the 
optimal saving rate may be lower than under 0=Ψ  due to the positive effect from ;5D  
decline in utility is still possible when ( ) .0</< GG-vDRFG 5R   
(D) ( ):< GG-v-D5   utility grows regardless of investments; investment policy is 
important as a determinant of the level of utility along the growing path (Bazhanov 2008). 
Types C and D may correspond to an economy where the planner underestimates 
future production possibilities (Section 4.1). 
Condition (9) shows that, for ,0<Ψ  the minimum investment G  that provides non-
declining utility may be essentially higher than zero. The next section illustrates that such a 
value of ,G  guaranteeing ,0≥U  may not exist. 
 
4. Dynamic inefficiency and sustainability: examples 
 
In the examples below, 05D  denotes a deviation of the ratio RR FF /  along the planner’s 
optimal path from a first-best path and *5D  – a deviation of this ratio along the first-best path 
from the planner’s path ( 05*5 -= DD ). For succinctness, the planner’s optimal paths and the 
models that do not take into account some of the distortions are called below “undistorted.” 
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4.1. Resource-augmenting technical change 
 
Assume that 4D  is the only distortion in a real economy: ),/,(+-= 4 LLXDRS R  where 
LLR /  is the share of the exploration sector and 0)•(4 ≥D  is the increment of the resource 
stock due to research (Takayama 1980).  
If a planner does not use the information about D4 and works with the undistorted 
model, the planner’s decisions are inefficient with 
./)/(=)/()/(= 445 RSXDSXXDD ∂∂∂∂∂∂    
However, the claim of Proposition 1 in this case is17 
,)/(= 000 GGGvC  -  
which formally coincides with the efficient case. Indeed, if a sustainable path is feasible, the 
planner can implement it with the same policy G0 even without additional opportunities. 
Inefficiency of the path C(t) can be shown, for example, when the planner follows a constant-
consumption criterion. As is known from theory, a higher resource stock results in a higher 
optimal level of constant consumption. Therefore, the efficient planner recalculates the 
optimal path C*(t) with the updates in the stock, which results in a piecewise-constant path 
with growing levels. Hence, C*(t) will be Pareto-superior to the continuous path C(t) ≡ C(0). 
In this example, the discrepancy between theory and real life may result in a 
sustainable but inefficient path. Dynamic inefficiency can be reduced only by adjustment of 
                                                        
17 Utility is not distorted here ( 0=
2DU ); hence, formula (8) becomes 
000 )/(= GGGvC  -  since 
22+= DUCUU DC
  and .0=)/(+-=/Ψ 45 SXFDRFDU RRC ∂∂  
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the resource policy when the planner updates the information about reserve estimates. This 
adjustment can result in sustainable and asymptotically efficient economy. 
 
4.2. Inadequate accounting system 
 
Assume that production and social utility are negatively affected in a real economy by 
the damage 21 == DDD  caused by a stock externality18 ( 0<  ,0<  ,0> DDX FUD ). If a 
planner uses an accounting system that disregards the damage, then, according to Lemma 1, 
the planner’s paths are dynamically inefficient with .0>/)/+(-=05 RXCDD FDUUFD 19 The 
planner’s problem reduces in this case to the one of Solow (1974) - Hartwick (1977), where, 
under the maximin criterion, the path of extraction starts from a higher level than in the 
efficient case,20 and the economy follows a constant-consumption path (due to 0=G ) with a 
higher level than the initial level of the efficient path, which is measured in utility units. Since 
the planner assumes that ,0== DD FU  formula (8) becomes 
.)/(= 000 GGGvC  -  
In reality, however, the change in well-being is21 
                                                        
18 For example, D  may result from irreversible climate change (Stollery 1998). 
19 As usual, .0>CU  
20 When damage affects only production, Stollery (1998, p. 735) showed that the optimal extraction 
starts from a lower initial level and declines slower than in the case with no damage. The same result 
for damage in utility was obtained in Bazhanov (2012, formula (33), Fig. 4). 
21 Eq. (12) can be obtained from Eq. (8) using the expression for *5D  and the fact that .= XRDD  
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,)+(+)/(= 000 DUUFUGGGvU DCDC  -  (12) 
which is negative for the planner’s paths of investment and extraction ( 0=0G ) since 
.0<)+( DUUF DCD   The investment G  that provides 0>U  does not exist here when the 
damage is large, namely, when 
.0<]-)-([-<)+( CRDCD UGRFQvDUUF   
Hence, the undistorted policies result in inefficiency and unsustainability of this economy. 
A non-declining path of the true quality of life (utility) can be achieved in this example 
only when the planner recognizes the damages and reconsiders the measure of progress in 
the society.22 This done, the planner, situated in the Solow-Hartwick case, can obtain a 
sustainable and first-best optimal path by changing the resource policy alone, namely, by 
reducing extraction, while the investment rule remains the same.23 
 
4.3. Insecure property rights 
 
Following Arrow et al. (2003, p. 664), assume that the owner )2;1=( ≥NNi  i   
extracts a liquid resource from the pool with the stock .iS  All N owners are identical, non-
                                                        
22 A review on development of the theory of social accounting is in Aronsson and Löfgren (2010). A 
practical illustration of the changes in the measure of social progress is the development of the 
Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting, which was first offered as a handbook on 
environmental accounting in UN (1993) and eventually became a legal base in EU (2011). 
23 Stollery (1998) showed that the Hartwick rule ( 0=G ) is still optimal in this economy. 
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cooperative, and the pools are separated by porous barriers. The resource diffuses from 
larger pools to smaller ones with the same rate .0>λ 24 Then the depletion equations are 
( ) ,1=,--= NiRSSλS ij iiji  ∑≠  
where )(= tRR ii  is the rate of extraction of the owner i at the moment t. The necessary 
conditions for PV-maximization of the each owner’s utility yield equation (5) with 
0>)1(== 5 λ-NDτ  (socially efficient paths require N=1). This inefficiency results in the 
distorted path of extraction 
∑N
i
ηtDρ
i eSηDρtRtR 1=
/)+(-
05
5]/)+[(=)(=)(~  
with the higher initial rate )0(~R  and faster decline )0(~R  than for the efficient path 
.]/[=)( /0
ηtρ-eSηρtR  
In these formulas, 0>ρ  is the social discount rate, and 1>η  – the elasticity of 
marginal utility. Hence, the distorted equation for the whole reserve is ,+= 4DR-S  where 
.~=4 R-RD  In this example, 4D  does not depend directly on the extracted resource X, and 
deviation 5D  does not depend on ;4D  both these distortions result from imperfect institutions, 
expressed in 2≥N  and .0>λ 25 
                                                        
24 No barriers corresponds to .∞→λ  
25 Formally, the link )( 45 DD  is [ ],)/(/)/(= )/(045 ηtρ-eηtρ-StDWtη-ρ-D  where ]•[W  is the Lambert 
W function. Numerically, using computational software (for example, Maple), this formula gives 
λ-ND )1(=5  for any t when ./1>]}•[arg{ e-W  Also, formally, 4D  changes with X since both are 
changing in time. However, it can be shown that 4D  cannot be represented as a function of X only. 
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For illustration, assume that ,06.0=v  and .04.0=/ -GG  Since 05 ≥D  for any ,0≥t  
a feasible investment K  can change the sign of U  if and only if (Corollary 1) 
( )[ ] .0>1-1.0<)1-( RRFQλN  
When this condition is not satisfied, only institutional changes and resource policies can 
prevent decline in utility. An investment provides non-declining utility here if and only if 
[ ]( ),1+)1-(10   or   0>)1-(10 QRFλNwRFλNG RR ≥≥  
which may be very restrictive for .1>N  
It is illustrative to consider two cases. 
(a) Large resource-poor economy ( 1=;101= RRFQ ). In this case, K  can change the 
sign of U  if and only if ,10<)1-( λN  which means, for example, that, for ,1=λ  utility declines 
for any K  (type A) if .10>N  Let .5=N  Then the saving rate, compensating for the shrinking 
resource and inefficiency, should be no less than 101/41=minw  (or 101/40/ ≥QG ), 
whereas with no distortion ( 1=N ), utility grows for any 101/1>w  (or 0>G ). 
(b) Small resource-rich economy ( 10=;11= RRFQ ). K  can change the sign of U  if 
and only if ;01.0<)1-( λN  for example, for 01.0≥λ  and ,2≥N  utility declines regardless of 
any feasible investment. Let 009.0=λ  and .2=N  Then not declining utility is possible when 
                                                                                                                                               
Namely, the assumption ),(= 44 XDD  given ,τ  the expression ,
~=4 R-RD  and using Lemma 1, 
results in D4 = (N - 1)λX + D4 (0), since .0=== 321 DDD  Here, .η/Sλ-N-D 04 )1(=)0(  However, since 
the reserve 0S  is fixed, 4D  must result only in intertemporal redistribution of the resource, namely, the 
condition 0=)(0 4∫
∞ dttD  must hold, which is not true for 4D  derived in this way. 
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almost all output is being invested, namely, ,11/9.10≥w  although, for this resource-
dependent economy, even with no distortion ( 1=N ), the saving rate yielding at least constant 
utility must be very high, namely, .91.0/=min ≈QRFw R  
The use of the policies for undistorted model results in this example in inefficiency and 
unsustainability; moreover, a feasible investment compensating for the inefficiency and 
providing non-declining utility may not exist. Therefore, the policy for increasing sustainability 
by increasing investments, which is recommended by the undistorted model, may cause a 
sharp decline in current utility below a subsistence minimum without reaching the goals of 
sustainability. This outcome implies that institutions must be corrected first in order to reduce 
inefficiency and only secondly the policies for the undistorted model can be applied. 
 
5. Model dependency of sustainability evaluation 
 
As is known, the gap between sustainability evaluation and actual sustainability 
depends not only on disregarded inefficiencies. The example provided in this section shows 
how sustainability evaluation may depend on the form of the indicator and on the specification 
of the same effects in the model. 
 
5.1. Indicators GI based on CUC and on the change in intergenerational welfare 
 
Indicator GI that shows CUC may not reflect the change in the ability of an economy to 
maintain non-declining utility during a long period of time. For example, in the DHS economy 
( βαRKRKFQ =),(= ), indicator (7) expressed as a share of GDP takes the form ,-=/ βwQG  
where w is the rate of investment ( wQK = ). Assume, for simplicity, that utility monotonically 
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depends on consumption (no damages). In this economy with ,> βα  an economic program 
with non-declining consumption exists at 0= tt  if and only if26 
.0)]-(/[-:
00
0 ≥t=tt=t∞ βαQSβKRw=/QG  (13) 
In this important particular case of the indicator GI, the resource price shows the change in 
the maximum level of consumption that can be maintained forever, while the resource stock is 
changed by one unit. Note that ,∞G  as it is expressed in (13), is always non-negative for 
,< βα  i. e., when a non-declining path of consumption does not exist (Solow 1974). 
Therefore, if α  and β  are to be determined by calibration (for example, Bazhanov 2011, 
Section 3), a more convenient form of this indicator is .)/(--=
0=0 tt
kSβKRβαG ∞  This 
expression is always negative when a non-declining path of consumption does not exist. 
Hence, this economy is potentially sustainable at 0= tt  (a program with non-declining 
utility exists)27 if and only if ,]/[)-(≤/)(
0
00 t=tKββαwQStR  which means that potential 
                                                        
26 Derivation of ,∞G  which is called the level of potential sustainability, is provided in Bazhanov (2011).  
27 This definition, offered in Bazhanov (2011), is partly equivalent to the following definition of Pezzey 
(2004): an economy is sustainable at time ,0t  if max0 )( UtU ≤  (the economy is not overconsuming at 
0t ), where maxU  is the maximum sustainable level of utility that can be maintained forever, given the 
stocks of man-made and natural capital at .0t  The equivalence is only partial because, as Pezzey 
noted, his definition works only for efficient economies. An overextracting inefficient economy may be 
underconsuming due to inefficient use of the resource. For such an economy, a sustainable program 
may not exist; therefore, for sustainability evaluation of real economies, it is preferable to use the tools 
that can work under inefficiencies since real economies are, as a rule, inefficient. 
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sustainability can be achieved by a change in resource policy only, regardless of the value of 
0=
/ ttQG  and the sign of ).( 0tC  The indicators G  and ∞G  coincide if and only if the state of 
the economy satisfies a “perfection” condition ( ]/)-(=/ 0 KβαQSR ) with respect to a 
constant-consumption criterion (Bazhanov 2010). 
On the other hand, the indicator ∞G  does not reflect CUC and current level of utility. 
As a result, a positive value of this indicator may “approve” a sharp decline in the current rate 
of the resource extraction, which may lead to a drop in the level of utility below a subsistence 
minimum, violating intergenerational justice. Of course, unsustainability of an economy 
( 0<∞G ) calls for changes in investment and resource policies to increase ,∞G  which 
requires 1) to define the maximum value of ∞G  for an optimal growth; and 2) the optimal path 
of acceptable sacrifices in current utility for future sustainable development. 
 
5.2. The models of Russian oil extraction and sustainability evaluation 
 
For any sustainability indicator, the result of sustainability evaluation may be 
predetermined by a specification of the model. For example, Bazhanov (2011) provides a 
comparison of sustainability policies for the Russian economy, resulting from three different 
models that describe the role of oil in the economy. The assumptions of these models and the 
corresponding policy recommendations are briefly discussed below. 
(a) Oil as an equivalent to a financial asset. The studies of IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) offer a model for recommending sustainable budget policy to oil-exporting countries 
including Russia (Barnett, Ossowski 2003; Jafarov et al. 2006). Oil enters the model only as 
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an export good but not as a production factor. The budget constraint in this model can be 
written as follows: 
),(+)()(+)](),(),([)(+)( tiKtRtptLtKtAFtKtC WI≤  
where )(tC  – the aggregate government and private consumption at the time ;t )(tK  – 
investment into government and private “non-oil” capital )(tK ; )(tR  – the rate of oil extraction 
(all oil is being exported); )(tp  – the export price of oil; WK  – the government holdings in the 
world’s financial assets; i  – the rate of return on WK  (constant); )](),(),([ tLtKtAFI  – 
domestic “non-oil” production function, where IF  – Cobb-Douglas function; )(tA  – the level of 
technology, exogenously growing at a constant rate; )(tL  – labour. 
Indicators GI are not relevant to this model since the resource does not enter the 
production function. This model assumes that oil and financial assets are perfect substitutes 
(the elasticity of substitution between them is infinity). Therefore, the model can maintain non-
declining consumption during an infinite period of time relying only on the interest from 
financial assets ( WiK ) when oil is depleted. As a result, the IMF studies offer prospects of 
infinitely non-declining per capita consumption under the assumption that oil reserves will be 
exhausted by the middle of the 21st century. 
(b) Closed DHS model. Evaluation of sustainability requires that the model must allow 
both for sustainable and unsustainable outcomes depending on the paths of extraction and 
investment. The DHS model, which is based on the Cobb-Douglas production function with a 
resource as a factor, is the simplest model that satisfies this requirement: 
,)()()()(=))(),(,(=)( γβα tLtRtKtAtRtKtFtQ  
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where ,1=++);1,0(,, γβαγβα ∈  Q  – GDP, A  – the scale multiplier (TFP), K  – the stock of 
capital, R  – the rate of resource extraction, L  – labor, which is constant and equal to 
population. In the DHS model, the resource is a necessary28 factor of production, and the 
elasticity of substitution between the resource and man-made capital is unity. 
Calibration of this model based on the data of the Russian economy29 showed that 
0>G  and 0>∞G  (the model is potentially sustainable). However, this model recommends a 
more cautious resource policy than in case (a) since the existence of a program with non-
declining per capita consumption requires that the rates of oil extraction only asymptotically 
approach zero, always remaining positive. If oil is depleted in finite time, the model collapses. 
In practice, this means that a sustainable policy can be implemented, for example, by 
development of renewable energy and the use of oil only for production of recyclable 
materials with gradual reduction of oil input due to decreasing dissipation of these materials 
as a result of technical progress. 
(c) Open model (Bazhanov 2011, Section 5.2). In comparison with case (b), the model 
below specifies the production of GNP in more detail, which presumably should result in a 
more accurate sustainability evaluation; the incomes from oil export and foreign assets are 
considered here (as in case (a)) as separate parts of production: 
,++),(=+= WEIIIT ikprrkfkcy   
                                                        
28 A resource is necessary for production if output is zero in the absence of the resource and positive in 
the presence of any positive amounts of the resource and other necessary factors. 
29 In more detail, see Bazhanov (2011), Sections 3 and 5.1. 
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where y  – GNP, II βI
α
II rAkf =  – domestic production except oil export, EI rr ,  – the rates of 
domestic use and export of oil, p  – the price of oil, Wk  – holdings in the world’s financial 
assets: ,k-kk ITW =  Tk  – total capital (domestic Ik  plus the assets abroad), i  – interest 
rate on .Wk  The variables ,y  ,If  c  ,Ir  ,Er  ,Wr  ,Tk  ,Wk  and Ik  are in per capita units. The 
main difference between this model and the model in case (a) is that the flow of oil ,Ir  which 
is used in domestic production, is included in production function as a factor. 
Unlike the closed case (b), the open model, calibrated in the same way and using the 
same data (plus the data on incomes from foreign assets and oil exports), proved to be not 
only unsustainable ( 0<∞G  and 0<G ) but unsurvivable (consumption declined to zero along 
any feasible program).30 Some hypothetical changes in the data, which may correspond to a 
more thrifty resource policy and capital-labour augmenting advances in technical progress, 
may result in potential survivability ( βα > ) with 0<∞G  and ,0>G  or in potential 
sustainability with 0>∞G  and .0>G  
Hence, a model that is used for sustainability evaluation may predetermine a too 
optimistic forecast31 if this model 1) does not reflect the dependence of the production on a 
resource, as in case (a); or 2) does not include trade effects, as in case (b). In fact, the model 
                                                        
30 The model was unsurvivable because calibration yielded ,< βα  violating the Solow (1974) condition 
( βα > ) that allows to stretch out a limited reserve over an infinite period of time. 
31 A model, of course, may predetermine a too pessimistic forecast if, for example, in a real economy, 
oil can be substituted by renewable sources of energy but a model assumes that the elasticity of 
substitution between oil and man-made capital is zero: }.,min{= rβkαAf  In this case, output declines 
to zero with the exhaustion of the resource despite any efforts in investment. 
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in case (c), which is the most “pessimistic” in this example, may also be too optimistic 
because of the following unrealistic assumptions: 1) the resource is always productive; 2) the 
economy is always non-wasteful; 3) the model does not include all the resources that are 
necessary in production; and 4) there are no damages to utility and production, resulting from 
the resource use. Therefore, a resource policy based on this model can be considered only 
as an upper bound for the real path of extraction. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examined the effects of unaccounted inefficiencies on credibility of 
sustainability indicators and efficacy of investment. The study assumed that a social planner 
constructed optimal paths using a model that is not sufficiently adequate to the problem, for 
example, due to imperfections in knowledge or institutions. In order to imitate this natural 
discrepancy between theory and real life, this study extended the result of Hamilton and 
Hartwick (2005) regarding the role of genuine investment (GI) in current utility change (CUC) 
by assuming that 1) there are distortions that affect utility, production, balance equation, and 
the dynamics of the resource stock; and 2) the planner ignores some of the distortions. As a 
result, the planner’s paths are dynamically inefficient. Proposition 1 established the link 
between GI and CUC depending on the influence of this inefficiency. 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 showed that CUC can be determined by GI only when 
the influence of inefficiency is close to zero. These results entail a classification of resource 
economies by the importance of institutional, investment, and resource policies for CUC. 
The examples of inefficient economies demonstrated that 1) in the presence of 
inefficiencies, a feasible level of investment that provides a positive CUC may not exist; 2) an 
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economy may be sustainable, when the planner underestimates future production 
possibilities, or unsustainable, when the planner uses an inadequate accounting system or 
ignores institutional imperfections. 
The results of this study imply that, for sustainability of real economies, 1) institutional 
and resource policies may be more important than investment when the level of inefficiency is 
high; and 2) it is preferable that a resource policy is more conservative than is prescribed by a 
theory. In the former conclusion, investment policy, of course, is still important as a 
determinant of the level of utility along a growing or declining path and as a determinant of 
growth when the level of inefficiency is low. In the latter conclusion, an overly conservative 
resource policy may result in dynamic inefficiency, but with updates in knowledge, the policy 
can be corrected, and the economy can be asymptotically efficient. 
Besides the influence of disregarded inefficiencies, an indicator that is linked to CUC 
may not reflect sustainability, because, by construction, this indicator does not show the 
change in the long-term ability of the economy to maintain non-declining utility. In order to 
evaluate current sustainability change, the change in the resource stock should be measured 
in prices that show, for example, the change in the maximum level of utility that can be 
maintained forever. However, an indicator based on these prices may not reflect CUC. As a 
result, an increase in the long-term welfare may be obtained at the cost of an unacceptable 
decline in current utility, violating the principles of sustainability and intergenerational justice. 
The properties of various forms of sustainability indicators imply that they may complement 
each other in sustainability evaluation. Alternatively, another indicator that is consistent with a 
criterion of intergenerational justice at any moment in time can be constructed. 
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Despite all the difficulties with the practical use of indicator GI, the algorithm of its 
calculation undoubtedly provides useful information for policymakers by showing changes in 
factors that influence social welfare and sustainability. It is apparent that the development of 
knowledge will further improve the processes of gathering this information and its use for 
sustainability policies. 
 
7. Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1 
 
Since optimal paths are always efficient, a necessary condition of dynamic efficiency 
for economy (1)-(4) can be obtained from optimality conditions, for example, in the problem of 
PV-maximization32 of ∫∞0 2 )(),( dttπDCU  with a discount factor ).(tπ  The Hamiltonian of this 
problem is ),-(+)---(+)(),(= 432 RDµDKδCFµtπDCUH SK 33 and the Pontryagin-type 
necessary conditions are 
CH = ,0=-)( KC µtπU  (14) 
RH = ,0=- SRK µFµ  (15) 
Kµ = ),-(-=- δFµKH KK∂∂  (16) 
Sµ = )//(+/{=/ 312 12 XDXDFµXDU)t(π-SH- DKD ∂∂-∂∂∂∂∂∂   
                                                        
32 The maximin, formulated as ),(=max 0
-
,
CRconstUdteδU tδ
CR
≡∫
∞  with the additional constraint 
,=),( 2 UDCU  yields the same result (Leonard and Long (1992, 300–304)). 
33 Here and below, Kµ  and Sµ  are indexed dual variables for capital and resource stock unlike 
,,,,,
2 KDCRC FUUHH  and ,RF  which are the partial derivatives of ,,UH  and .F  
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 ./}/+ 4 SXXDµS ∂∂∂∂  (17) 
Eq. (17) with Kµ  from (14) becomes 
Sµ = .}+)()(+)(
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The time derivative of Eq. (15) is ,+= RKRKS FµFµµ   which, combined with (18), 
results in 
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The last equation, after dividing through by RF  and substitutions for Kµ  from (16) and 
Sµ  from (15), becomes 
,}+])(+[
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which, divided through by Kµ  with substitution for Kµ  from (14), yields ),(+-=/ DτδFFF KRR  
where )(Dτ  is defined by Eq. (6)■ 
 
8. Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The proof follows the approach of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, Proposition 1), which 
was first applied in Hartwick (1977). The differences are that the current proof uses: 1) utility 
as a measure of well-being (due to distortion 2D ); 2) a modified HR to substitute for RF  
instead of the standard HR. Namely, equations (1), (3), and (5) give 
[ ] .-+/)(--)+-(-)-(=
-+---++=---++=
31
3131
1
11
DFDdtRFdKRFτδFKδF
FRFRDKKδFDFRFKDKKδFDFRFKC
DRRKK
RRDRKDRK


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The planner uses the indicator GI for the undistorted model: .= RRF-KG   Then 
.+= 31 1 RFτ-D-FDG-vGC RD
  (19) 
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that ./X= XDD ii ∂∂  Then, using Lemma 1, 
./}+-/+{-= 43215 21 SXFDDUUDFDRFDRFτ RCDDRR ∂∂
  
Substitution of this expression into (19) results in 
,/)+/(+)/+1)(-(+--= 42315 21 SXFDUUDSXDFDRFDGvGC RCDDR ∂∂∂∂
  
which, after substitution into ,+= 22 DUCUU DC
  yields 
)./+1(+] -)/+1)( --(---[=
21 244135 SXUDFDSXFDFDDRFDGvGUU DRRDRC ∂∂∂∂
  
The use of the definition of Ψ results in Eq. (8) of the proposition. 
When economy (1)-(4) is dynamically efficient ( 0=5D ), Eq. (8) can be obtained from 
the result of Dixit et al. (1980, Theorem 1) or from a generalization of this result in Hamilton 
and Withagen (2007). Namely, in terms of the present value prices of utility, capital, and the 
resource, defined in Lemma 1 as ,),( Kµtπ  and ,Sµ  these results claim that 
( ),+-=)( SµKµ
dt
d
Utπ SK   
which, using Eqs. (14)-(16), can be rewritten as follows: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ].--=+/-=-=
+-=/+-=)(
GGδFµGµµGµGµ
dt
d
SFKµ
dt
d
µµSKµ
dt
d
Utπ
KKKKKK
RKKSK


 
Then, with the use of formula (14) and the notation ,-=: δFv K  it becomes 
,)/-(= CGUGGvU   
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which is Eq. (8) for 0=Ψ=5D ■ 
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